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Abstract  
We study rental income tax compliance using a large-scale randomized field 
experiment and register data with third-party information on the ownership of 
apartments. We analyze the responses of potential landlords to treatment letters 
notifying them of stricter tax enforcement, or providing simplifying information 
on filing practices for the rental income tax. We find that both types of letters 
caused an increase in the propensity to report rental income, with letters notifying 
landlords of the use of third-party information in tax enforcement having the 
strongest effect. Our research design also allows us to analyze different types of 
spillover effects in tax enforcement. We find an indication of positive reporting 
spillovers within the household, but do not find clear evidence of spillovers 
between landlords in local rental markets. 
Key words: Tax compliance, field experiment, rental market 
JEL classes: H26, H31 
 
1 Introduction
Rental income is an interesting form of taxable income in several respects and somewhat
different from other forms of capital income. First of all, it is largely lacking in third
party reporting. There are reasons to believe that this might create opportunities for
tax evasion.1 Related to this, in many countries there seems to exist clear economic
incentive for tax evasion. For instance, in many OECD countries rental property is the
most heavily taxed type of asset (OECD (2018)). Further, the ownership of rental units
tends to be widespread across households, which makes different types of enforcement
measures potentially costly for tax authorities.
There is increased awareness of the potential consequences of rental income tax evasion
for the efficiency of taxation. This is especially important if tax evasion opportunities vary
between different types of capital income. For instance, in the U.K., it is estimated that a
significant tax loss is likely in the rental market.2 In addition, a recent report concluded
that roughly half of the landlords in one borough of London do not report their rental
income.3
We analyze tax enforcement and compliance in the rental housing market using a large-
scale field experiment in Finland and register data on the entire population of Finnish
private individuals owning housing units.4 The data enables identifying apartments occu-
pied by someone else than the owner, and the owners of such apartments are classified as
potential landlords in our study. That is, even though such third-party information was
not routinely used in the enforcement of rental income taxation during the study period,
it is possible to construct such measures through combining information from different
registers.
In the experiment, a randomly selected subset of potential landlords received letters
from the Finnish Tax Administration, notifying them of various features of rental income
tax filing and enforcement. The experiment comprised several treatments that allow us
to disentangle different determinants of non-compliance. First, ignorance (e.g. about
reporting requirements concerning income vs. expenses) and compliance costs may affect
1Several recent studies have analyzed the role of third-party reporting in other cases and have found
it to be an important factor in understanding tax evasion. See e.g. Kleven et al. (2011) and Harju et al.
(2017).
2“Tax evasion in 2014 and what can be done about it”
http://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Documents/PCSTaxGap2014Full.pdf.
3“Half of landlords in one London borough fail to declare rental income”, The Guardian, August 13,
2017.
4The experiment has been pre-registered at the AEA RCT Registry,
https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2575
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the level of non-compliance, and one of our treatments aimed at reducing these costs,
through providing simplifying information on the tax filing procedure and requirements
related to rental income taxation. Our second treatment signaled a general increase in
enforcement intensity to the recipients. Finally, our third treatment informed potential
landlords of the use of third-party information in tax enforcement, and allows us to assess
the effectiveness of third-party information in deterring tax evasion, compared with a
general increase in enforcement intensity.
We find that the treatment letters had an effect on the reporting behavior of potential
landlords. The effect is most pronounced on the extensive margin (i.e. increasing the
number of individuals that report a positive amount of rental income), while effects on
the intensive margin (i.e. on the euro amount of rental income reported) are smaller. The
strongest treatment, notifying potential landlords of the use of third-party information in
tax enforcement, has the strongest effect. In particular, potential landlords who did not
file any rental income in the year prior to the experiment respond very strongly to the use
of third-party information: the propensity to report a positive amount of rental income
was over 50 % higher in this group in the treatment year, compared to the baseline level
in the control group.
We also analyze whether information about intensified enforcement has spillover effects
beyond those individuals who receive a treatment letter. Spillover effects in tax reporting
may arise if the information on the treatments spreads between landlords, or within the
family. Using a randomized block design similar to Cre´pon et al. (2013), we analyze
spillover effects from intensified enforcement across landlords within local rental markets.
Further, the base population in our study is constructed in such a way that we are able
to also examine potential spillovers within the household.
We find some indication of spillover effects in tax reporting behavior within the house-
hold. We do not find clear evidence of enforcement spillovers between landlords in local
rental markets.
We contribute to previous literature in a number of ways. First, despite likely oppor-
tunities for evasion, prior literature on rental income tax evasion is very scarce. Wenzel
and Taylor (2004) carried out an experiment where owners of rental properties were asked
to itemize expenses in tax returns, which led to a 5−7.5% reduction in reported expenses
compared to receiving an information letter only.
Second, whereas the importance of third-party information in tax enforcement has been
acknowledged in earlier literature (e.g. Slemrod (2007), Kleven et al. (2011)), literature
utilizing randomized variation in third-party information is scarce.5 Harju et al. (2017)
5In Kleven et al. (2011), variation in 3rd party reporting comes from certain types of income being
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have implemented randomized variation in the salience of third-party information, albeit
in a quite different context, namely tax evasion on car imports.
Third, analyzing spillovers is essential for obtaining an accurate understanding of the
overall implications of stricter enforcement. Cre´pon et al. (2013) argue that in the context
of labour market policies, ignoring spillovers may bias our understanding of the effects
of a policy if making some individuals more employable has a negative externality on
other jobseekers. In the context of tax enforcement, ignoring spillover effects may lead
to misleading conclusions about the effects of intensified enforcement. Depending on the
sign of the spillover effect, the effects of enforcement may be understated or overstated if
one only looks at the direct effect. Ignoring some of these responses also leads to biased
estimates of the compliance gap (i.e. the amount of tax revenue that can be recouped
by more intensive enforcement).6 Further, understanding spillover effects helps in the
targeting of enforcement measures. A few earlier papers have studied regional enforcement
spillovers between individuals in the context of TV license fee collection (Rincke and
Traxler (2011), Drago et al. (2015) and income tax filing (Meiselman (2018)). Frimmel
et al. (2018) and Alstadsaeter et al. (2019) analyze tax evasion and avoidance spillovers
within the family, while these two papers do not focus on the effects of enforcement
measures. Pomeranz (2015), Boning et al. (2018) and Brockmeyer et al. (2018) analyze
enforcement spillovers in firm networks. We contribute to this literature by analyzing tax
enforcement spillovers both between landlords in local rental markets, as well as between
family members.
2 Institutional Background
Overall, more than 60% of Finnish households live in owner-occupied housing. In general,
the share is lower in large cities. For instance, in the capital city of Helsinki the share of
owner-occupiers is slightly less than 50%.
The Finnish rental market can be divided into the private rental market and social
subject to 3rd party reporting, while others (notably self-employment income) are not. In studying firm
responses to an audit experiment, Pomeranz (2015) compares those line-items in the VAT declaration
of firms that are covered by the paper trail (transactions between two firms) to line items that are not
(sales to final consumers). Naritomi (2016) compares retail transactions (where the extent of 3rd party
information increased due to a campaign that incentivized consumers to send in their receipts to the
authorities) and wholesale transactions (not affected by the campaign). In none of these studies was 3rd
party information in itself subject to randomization.
6See e.g. Gemmell and Hasseldine (2014) and Slemrod (2017).
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housing.7 We focus on the private rental market constituting roughly two thirds of the
overall rental market. In the private rental market, roughly half of the rental units are
owned by large institutional landlords. The other half are owned by private individuals.
Currently the net rental income is subject to a 30% capital income tax rate and 34% if
taxable income exceeds an annual threshold of 30,000 euros.8
Overall, in the private rental market, legislation on rental agreements is very flexible.
For instance, rent-setting is not subject to any restrictions.9 In addition, valid reasons for
contract termination include unpaid rents, sale of the dwelling by the landlord or personal
use. The annual mobility rate among renters is around 20% and is substantially higher
than the mobility rate of owner-occupier households.
The rental income tax is a non-negligible source of tax revenue in Finland. In 2015,
total reported rental income net of expenses amounted to 1.6 billion euros. The corre-
sponding tax revenue was more than 480 million euros (or 1.1% of the state tax revenue).
In the analysis, we focus on rental apartments owned by individuals. For the purposes
of this study, we identify likely landlords by combining register data on ownership and
flat occupancy in a manner discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.
Figure 1 illustrates the nature of the phenomenon under study. The figure shows the
share of individuals reporting rental income as well as the share of potential landlords and
total tax revenue by the number of potential rental apartments owned by the individual.
7In the social housing sector, rents and tenant selection are regulated. The housing units are owned
by municipalities and non-profit organizations that are not subject to regular capital income taxation.
8The tax rate has been slightly increased during the recent decades and the progressivity was intro-
duced in 2012.
9In the case of long-term rental agreements, the rent is typically reviewed annually. The size of annual
rent increases must be specified in the lease agreement and is typically based on the cost-of-living index.
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Figure 1: Rental income tax reporting by potential landlords
Notes: Figure describes reporting of rental income and the share of total tax revenue by the number of
potential rental flats owned in the end of tax year 2015. The data used in the figure contains individuals
in untreated control blocks (N = 19,028).
There are a number of interesting points to note from the figure. First, small scale
renting is highly prevalent, and significant from a tax revenue perspective: More than 80%
of all potential landlords own only one potential rental apartment, and their share of the
overall rental income tax revenue was almost 60%. Second, out of those individuals owning
one potential rental flat, roughly 75% reported some rental income to the tax authority
in tax year 2015. The figure also shows (right axis) the amount of rental income reported
in 2015 by the number of potential rental apartments.
As the ownership of rental units is widespread across households and small-scale renters
make up a large share of tax revenue, enforcement may be costly for tax authorities. This
underlines the importance of looking for ways to steer taxpayers to comply without audits.
Turning next to the tax-filing procedure, pre-populated income tax returns are sent
out to taxpayers in late April each year. They contain information on incomes that are
subject to third-party reporting. Thereafter, the taxpayer is required to submit a revised
return to the tax authority if any income information is missing from the pre-populated
return. The taxpayer can also apply for discretionary deductions (e.g. expenses for travel
to work). The taxpayers have to submit their corrections in May; otherwise, the original
proposal is implemented.
As income from rental property is not subject to any third-party reporting, those
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individuals with rental income always have to revise the pre-populated tax return and
submit the revision to the tax authority. Rental income is reported on a separate form
(see Appendix B), and income and deductible expenses have to be reported separately.
3 Research design and data
3.1 Experiment
3.1.1 Constructing the base population
The base population for the experiment was formed using national registers on flat own-
ership and flat occupancy to identify potential landlords.10 Information from different
registers can be combined using personal identification numbers that uniquely identify
individuals across different national registers.
We proceed as follows: Information on flat ownership is based on end of year 2015
situation.11 Information on personal addresses, i.e. flat occupancy in the end of 2015, is
obtained from another government register. Combining information from these different
registers, we classify flats that are occupied by someone else than one of the owners as
potential rental flats. For each potential rental flat owned by at least two individuals,
we identify the main owner and allocate the flat to this specific owner. These owners are
classified as potential landlords.
From each household with more than one potential landlord, we include only one in
the base population. We construct households using information on the street address.
For each household, we identify the individual with the largest number of potential rental
flats and select only this individual to the base population. This guarantees that only
one member of each household receives the treatment and this individual is the one with
most extensive ownership. We also drop individuals with more than 15 potential rental
flats.
In addition, some flats have several owners who are not members of the same house-
hold. As we wish to minimize spillovers across experimental treatment groups, we further
restrict the base population so that we randomly keep only one of the owners of jointly
owned flats.
10We focus on flats in apartment buildings and leave out detached houses which are often located in
rural areas with thin rental markets.
11We drop flats that have been bought in November or December because it is unlikely that a new
rental contract could have been made with a tenant before the end of 2015. We also drop flats with more
than 15 tenants and more than 5 owners.
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3.1.2 Treatments
The treatment letters were sent out in April 2016 by the Finnish Tax Administration. The
letters were sent out just prior to the time when taxpayers received their pre-populated
income tax returns. Reporting concerned income earned in 2015, and therefore any effects
that we find for the first treatment year are pure reporting responses. Any real responses
are ruled out by the timing of the experiment. However, we have data on reporting
behavior also for the following year, and any effects that we find on rental income reported
in 2017 (concerning income in tax year 2016) may incorporate both reporting and real
responses: Stricter enforcement increases the effective tax rate on rental income and may
therefore affect real behavior (portfolio choice) of landlords.
All in all, roughly 45,000 treatment letters were sent. The experiment consisted of
four different treatments: 1) Letter with a neutral reminder to file tax returns; 2) Letter
providing information on how to file rental income; 3) Letter notifying the recipient of a
general increase in the intensity of rental income tax enforcement; 4) Letter on intensified
enforcement of rental income taxation and a mention of the use of third-party informa-
tion on ownership of dwellings. All treatment letters (2)–(4) contained also the neutral
information provided in treatment letter (1), and therefore group (1) served as a baseline
for the actual treatments of interest.
The enforcement measures described in letters (3) and (4) were implemented by the
Finnish Tax Administration in summer 2016. The full letters are shown in Appendix B.
Table 1 describes our experimental design. We used a randomized block design, similar
to the design in Cre´pon et al. (2013), to assign individuals randomly to the four treatment
groups. To be able to analyze potential spatial spillovers of the treatments, we use the
following procedure. We first allocate each potential landlord in our base population to a
postcode area based on where the flats owned are located. Those owning flats in different
postcode areas are allocated to the postcode area with most flats.
Finland is a typical European country in the sense that most households live in owner-
occupied housing, and rental markets are mostly concentrated in the larger cities and
towns. As we wish to analyze spatial spillovers, we leave out housing market areas that
are mostly populated by owner-occupiers living in detached houses, and select into our
treatment only postcode areas with a reasonably dense rental market.12 These postcode
areas (or blocks) are then randomly assigned into three treatment groups with varying
12We leave out rural municipalities with less than 5,000 flats. Furthermore, we leave out postcodes
areas with less than 60 flats and with on average less than five flats per building. After these restrictions,
we have 263 postcode areas.
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intensity of treatment: i) control blocks where no letters were sent; ii) low-intensity blocks
where 24% of potential landlords in the base population received a letter; iii) high-intensity
blocks where 62% of potential landlords received a letter.13 In addition, the share of the
stronger treatment letters (3) and (4) was higher in the high-intensity blocks. For instance,
out of those receiving a letter, roughly a third in the low-intensity blocks and a half in
the high-intensity blocks received letter (4).
Table 1: Experimental design.
Not in blocks Control blocks
Low intensity
blocks
High intensity
blocks Total
No letter 28178 19208 21320 14995 83701
Letter 1 4779 0 1713 2502 8994
Letter 2 4871 0 1739 2383 8993
Letter 3 1397 0 1118 6476 8991
Letter 4 2813 0 2310 12863 17986
Total 42038 19208 28200 39219 128665
Postcode areas 4200 62 90 111 4463
Notes: Table shows the number of letters sent to different groups of potential landlords in the base
population in the treatment and control groups as well as the number of postcode areas.
Figure 2 shows an illustration of the block design for Helsinki, the capital city and
largest municipality in our data. There are roughly 650,000 inhabitants and 80 postcode
areas in Helsinki. The postcode areas with reasonably dense rental market are randomly
assigned to control, low-intensity or high-intensity groups (for data confidentiality reasons,
we are not able to show which ones).
13We first form groups of postcode areas with similar size. Then within each strata, randomly assign
postcode areas to different blocks.
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Figure 2: An illustration of the block design for Helsinki.
Source: City of Helsinki, Map service. https://kartta.hel.fi/
3.2 Data
Our data contains very rich information on individual incomes from different sources,
assets, and taxes paid. Summary statistics of key variables in the data are reported in
Table A1 of Appendix A.
Given that landlords and rental markets not in the blocks are quite different from
those in the blocks, we utilize data from the blocks only in our main analysis and report
the results for individuals outside the blocks in the appendix. This choice also allows us
to analyze spatial spillovers, and to isolate the treatment effects of the letters from such
spillovers.
Table 2 describes reporting of rental income before the treatment (Panel A) and after
the treatment (Panel B). The comparison of different treatment groups in Panel A shows
that the randomization has been successful as the groups are very similar to each other
in terms of the pre-treatment propensity to report, reported gross rental income and
reported net rental income. This is to be expected by construction.
Overall, a comparison of Panel A and B indicates that the propensity to report rental
income is higher after the treatment. This is true also in the ”No letter” group. Such
changes over time may be due to general developments in the rental market. One specific
reason may be related to turnover: some of those who owned a potential rental flat in
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2015 may not have owned one in 2014. This would mechanically increase the propensity
to report from 2014 to 2015.
A first indication that the treatment had some effect on the propensity to report
rental income is visible in Panel B: For example, those receiving Letter (4) had a higher
propensity to report than those not receiving a letter or receiving Letter (1).
Table 2: Reporting of rental income before and after the treatment.
Reported rental
income 1/0
Gross rental
income
Net rental
income
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Panel A: Before treatment (tax year 2014)
No letter 0.735 0.441 8146 23774 4473 14028
Letter 1 0.744 0.437 8040 16979 4485 13643
Letter 2 0.742 0.438 7743 11885 4267 7629
Letter 3 0.739 0.439 8143 17851 4601 11225
Letter 4 0.745 0.436 7911 16212 4342 8988
Panel B: After treatment (tax year 2015)
No letter 0.783 0.412 8994 25886 4910 15886
Letter 1 0.803 0.398 9029 20720 5043 15298
Letter 2 0.810 0.392 8564 12091 4733 7678
Letter 3 0.813 0.390 9092 18592 5106 11508
Letter 4 0.824 0.380 8890 17707 4910 10277
Notes: Table shows rental income reporting before the treatment (tax year 2014) and after the treatment
(tax year 2015) in the treatment groups.
3.3 Empirical strategy
We use the following Difference-in-Differences type model to estimate the effects of the
various treatments in our experimental design:
yit = α+ζAftert+
∑
j
βjLetjAftert+
∑
k
γkBlokAftert+
∑
j
λjLetj+
∑
k
ηkBlok+it (1)
where yit is the outcome for individual i at time t. We control for general changes
in outcomes in the after period (either tax year 2015 or 2016) with dummy Aftert.
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We consider the effects of the different treatment letters (Letj) separately, and include
dummies for high or low intensity blocks (Blok). βj then identify the effects of the different
letters on outcome y. Similarly, γk identify the effects of being in a high or low treatment
block (over and above the direct effect of receiving a letter), relative to the control block.
 is the error term. We cluster standard errors at the postcode level.
We also report results at the block level using the following specification:
yit = α + ζAftert +
∑
k
γkBlokAftert +
∑
k
ηkBlok + it (2)
This specification does not include controls for the different letter treatments sepa-
rately. In this case, the estimates capture the combined effect of all four treatments,
while treatment intensity differs between the three groups.
In both specifications, we include individual fixed effects and control for the number
of all flats owned.14 We also control for the enforcement measures associated with the
experiment.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive analysis
Figures 3 and 4 provide first descriptive evidence on the effects of our experimental treat-
ments. Both figures show reporting behavior in our base population in the treatment
and control blocks in tax years 2013-2016. Tax years 2013-2014 are pre-treatment years,
and tax year 2015 is the first treatment year. The development is shown separately for
the control blocks, those who did not receive a letter in the treatment blocks, as well as
recipients of treatment letters (2)-(4) combined.
Figure 3 shows the development of the share of potential landlords reporting a positive
amount of rental income. The fraction develops similarly in all the groups before the
treatment, and the pre-treatment levels are not statistically significantly different from
each other. This is in line with the observation from Table 2 above that the randomization
appears to have been successful.
The figure indicates that the treatment letters caused a statistically significant increase
in the fraction of potential landlords reporting a positive amount of rental income in tax
year 2015. In the following year, the fraction reporting rental income declines somewhat.
14We exclude individuals who own more than 20 flats. This constitutes less than 0.2% of our observa-
tions.
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On the other hand, other landlords in the treatment blocks do not seem to be affected on
average (a measure of possible spillover effects, also to be discussed in more detail below).
Finally, Figure 3 shows that approximately 77% of the potential landlords in the con-
trol blocks reported a positive amount of rental income in 2015. There may be some
measurement error and some potential landlords may not report rental income for legiti-
mate reasons, as it is possible that no rent was paid even if the apartment was occupied.
Nevertheless, it seems likely that non-compliance in rental income taxation is a non-trivial
phenomenon. Also, landlords’ reactions to the treatment letters are a first indication of
underlying non-compliance. It is therefore of interest to analyze how compliance can
be improved. In the next section, we turn to an econometric analysis of the effects of
information on stricter tax enforcement in the rental housing market.
Figure 3: Fraction of potential landlords reporting rental income, by treatment groups and
letters, tax years 2013-2016.
Figure 4 shows the development of the amount of net rental income. The figure is
based on an individual-level fixed-effects regression and also includes block-level net rental
income as a control. The figure shows that in the treatment year (tax year 2015), net
rental income increased for those receiving a letter, but did not change for other groups.
In the following year (tax year 2016) net income is still on a higher level in the group
that received the letter. In that year, there is a slight increase visible also for those in
the treatment blocks who did not receive any letter. The latter effect is consistent with a
12
positive spillover effect, though the effect is not statistically significant.15
Figure 4: Net rental income reported by landlords, by treatment groups and letters, tax years
2013-2016. Based on an individual level fixed-effects regression.
4.2 Econometric analysis
We now turn to regression analysis. We first report results from estimating equation (2)
at the block level for the first treatment year without separate controls for the different
treatment letters. Table 3 shows reporting behavior in low-intensity and high-intensity
postcode areas compared to control areas with no letters.
The estimates capture the combined effect of all four treatments, while treatment
intensity differs between the treatment groups. In the low-intensity blocks 24%, and in
the high-intensity blocks 62% of potential landlords in the base population received a
letter. In addition, the share of treatment letters (3) and (4) was higher in the high-
intensity blocks (cf. Table 1).
15As we showed above, randomization has led to balanced samples across the treatment groups in 2014.
Figure 4 shows that net rental income also develops reasonably parallel from 2013 to 2014 across different
blocks. Control blocks are however on a slightly less steep trend than treatment blocks on average. This
may be due to the small number of blocks, 63 in the control group. This could create a small bias to our
regression estimates quantifying the effect, which we need to take into account in our total assessment of
the results.
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Table 3: Effects by geographical intensity of the treatment.
Dep. Var.
Reported
rental
income
(0/1)
Rental
income
(gross)
Rental
income
(net)
Spouse reported
rental
income
(0/1)
HH rental
income
(gross)
HH rental
income
(net)
Low intensity 0.00278 68.77 101.1* 0.00293 93.48 146.4**
blocks [0.00400] [76.43] [53.83] [0.00288] [85.33] [63.13]
High intensity 0.0136*** 79.28 122.1** 0.00222 123 179.8***
blocks [0.00360] [77.96] [48.07] [0.00248] [91.71] [62.08]
N 172950 172950 172950 106228 172950 172950
R-sq 0.075 0.038 0.02 0.021 0.029 0.017
Baseline mean 0.747 8044.9 4366.6 0.427 10107.7 5491.7
Notes: Table shows estimates for the effect of geographic intensity of the treatment on reporting of rental
income. Control blocks where no treatment letters were sent is the excluded category. Data covers tax
years 2014 (before treatment) and 2015 (after treatment). All models include individual fixed effects, the
number of apartments owned and additional enforcement measures related to the treatment letters as
controls. Standard errors clustered at postcode area level (263 clusters) are in brackets. Significance is
denoted by asterisks: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Bold font indicates significant difference at
5% level relative to low intensity blocks
Table 3 shows that the fraction of potential landlords reporting a positive amount
of rental income is slightly higher in the low-intensity blocks than in the control blocks;
and even higher in the high-intensity blocks. The difference of the high-intensity blocks
to the control blocks, as well as between the high-intensity and low-intensity blocks, are
statistically significant. This is first evidence that the treatment letters had an impact
on reporting rental income and that the intensity of treatment might matter. Further,
also the reported net rental income is highest in the high-intensity blocks. Note that the
change in the reported net rental income may be larger than the change in gross income
as the treatment may affect also the reporting of deductions.
The effects reported in Table 3 may stem from three sources: differences in the share of
potential landlords receiving a letter; differences in the share of different types of letters;
and differences in potential spillover effects of the letters due to differences in the intensity
of treatment between blocks. In the following analysis, we aim to disentangle the relative
importance of these different channels.
Table 4 turns to analyze the effects of the different treatment letters (equation (1)),
showing the effects of the treatments on the reporting of rental income for tax year
2015. We analyze effects on three outcomes: propensity to report a positive amount of
14
rental income, reported gross rental income and reported net rental income (i.e. income
minus expenses). The table shows separately the effects of all four treatment letters (βj
coefficients) and the blocks (γk coefficients).
16
Recall that letter (1) was a neutral reminder to file tax returns, not related to rental
income. Letter (2) provided information on how to file rental income. Letters (3) and
(4) provided information on intensified enforcement of rental income taxation and letter
(4) also included a mention of the use of third-party information on the ownership of
dwellings in tax enforcement.
The first observation is that all letters caused a statistically significant increase in the
propensity to report (column 1). Letter (2) providing information on reporting procedures
and requirements on rental income increased compliance, which suggests that outright
mistakes may play a role in non-compliance. Letter (4), the strongest treatment, which
notified potential landlords of the use of third-party information in tax enforcement, had
the largest effect. The effect of letter (4) is to increase the compliance rate by about 3.0%-
points, which amounts to a relative effect of 4.0% compared to the baseline compliance
rate of 74.7%.
The above estimates concern effects on compliance at the extensive margin. The
estimates for the effects on the amount of net rental income reported (column 3) are also
positive, and statistically significant for letters (3) and (4).
16Table A2 in Appendix A shows the results for the base population outside the treatment blocks. The
results are broadly in line with those in Table 4.
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Table 4: Effects of letters and geographical intensity of the treatment.
Dep. Var.
Reported
rental
income
(0/1)
Rental
income
(gross)
Rental
income
(net)
Spouse reported
rental
income
(0/1)
HH rental
income
(gross)
HH rental
income
(net)
Letter 1 0.0107* 166.8 144.5 0.00149 195 121.2
[0.00586] [178.8] [87.83] [0.00536] [185.6] [103.8]
Letter 2 0.0229*** 60.69 68.11 -0.00865** -66.11 19.75
[0.00599] [92.74] [75.33] [0.00425] [260.7] [129.6]
Letter 3 0.0180*** 127.1* 112.4* 0.00613 153.7 95.1
[0.00394] [71.03] [66.35] [0.00417] [94.04] [82.53]
Letter 4 0.0302*** 177 162.1*** 0.00361 294.7** 219.7***
[0.00370] [109.0] [48.78] [0.00305] [148.1] [75.52]
Low intensity -0.00226 36.69 71.59 0.0029 57.64 117.5*
blocks [0.00402] [77.04] [54.94] [0.00291] [87.50] [64.06]
High intensity -0.00053 -8.868 41.64 0.000761 0.787 88.55
blocks [0.00395] [79.65] [51.78] [0.00296] [93.66] [67.95]
N 172950 172950 172950 106228 172950 172950
R-sq 0.076 0.038 0.02 0.021 0.029 0.017
Baseline mean 0.747 8044.9 4366.6 0.427 10107.7 5491.7
Notes: Table shows estimates for the effect of treatment letters and geographic intensity of the treatment
on reporting of rental income. The excluded category for letters 1-4 is no letter and the excluded category
for low and high intensity blocks is control blocks where no treatment letters were sent. Data covers tax
years 2014 (before treatment) and 2015 (after treatment). All models include individual fixed effects, the
number of apartments owned and additional enforcement measures related to the treatment letters as
controls. Standard errors clustered at postcode area level (263 clusters) are in brackets. Significance is
denoted by asterisks: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Bold font indicates significant difference at
5% level relative to letter (1).
We next divide the sample into two subgroups based on whether the individual re-
ported any rental income in tax year 2014, i.e. one year before the treatment. Table 5
and Table 6 report the results for these subgroups.
Table 5 first shows the results for individuals who did not report any rental income in
tax year 2014. While some of these individuals may indeed not have owned or rented out
a flat in the previous year, this is nevertheless a subgroup where non-compliance appears
more likely. Indeed, the baseline compliance rate (at the extensive margin) in the control
block in tax year 2015 in this subgroup is only about 15%.
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The effects on the treatment letters on the propensity to report are now much stronger
than in Table 4. Given the low baseline compliance rate in this subgroup, the relative effect
on the compliance rate of intensified enforcement is very large in this group: receiving
letter (4) causes an over 50% increase in the propensity to report rental income. Such a
strong reaction indeed indicates that baseline non-compliance is likely to be extensive in
this group.
Table 5: Effects of letters and geographical intensity of the treatment – subgroup with no
reported rental income in tax year 2014.
Dep. Var.
Reported
rental
income
(0/1)
Rental
income
(gross)
Rental
income
(net)
Spouse reported
rental
income
(0/1)
HH rental
income
(gross)
HH rental
income
(net)
Letter 1 0.0301* -146.6 -241.2** 0.02 -230.8 -342.1*
[0.0153] [216.5] [107.4] [0.0157] [312.6] [195.5]
Letter 2 0.0642*** 136.3 42.16 -0.0196 325.7 83.97
[0.0160] [172.1] [111.2] [0.0157] [493.9] [233.9]
Letter 3 0.0460*** -186.3 -106.5 0.00451 -245.4 -161.1
[0.0111] [154.3] [100.6] [0.0138] [188.3] [127.9]
Letter 4 0.0856*** 363.3 159.8 0.0199** 585.6 285.1
[0.00972] [285.7] [139.3] [0.00976] [381.9] [216.1]
Low intensity 0.00579 29.94 65.3 0.0188** 167.7 120.7
blocks [0.0129] [172.4] [110.5] [0.00861] [225.5] [137.6]
High intensity 0.0114 173.9 167.8 0.00314 120.4 159.5
blocks [0.0135] [178.6] [105.1] [0.00988] [233.9] [146.8]
N 45398 45398 45398 23510 45398 45398
R-sq 0.367 0.129 0.102 0.115 0.116 0.099
Baseline mean 0.152 1065.8 531.4 0.118 1582.9 793.1
Notes: Table shows estimates for the effect of treatment letters and geographic intensity of the treatment
on reporting of rental income. Sample includes individuals who did not report rental income in 2014.
The excluded category for letters (1)-(4) is no letter and the excluded category for low-intensity and
high-intensity blocks is control blocks where no treatment letters were sent. Data covers tax years 2014
(before treatment) and 2015 (after treatment). All models include individual fixed effects, the number
of apartments owned and additional enforcement measures related to the treatment letters as controls.
Standard errors clustered at postcode area level (263 clusters) are in brackets. Significance is denoted
by asterisks: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Bold font indicates significant difference at 5% level
relative to letter (1).
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In the previous table, we focused on the individuals who did not report any rental
income in 2014. To complete the analysis, Table 6 shows the results for individuals who
reported some rental income in tax year 2014. For this subgroup, the baseline compliance
rate is as high as 97.6%, implying that almost all of those who reported rental income in
tax year 2014 continue to do so in tax year 2015. Nevertheless, letters (3) and (4) clearly
had a positive effect on the propensity to report also in this group. Moreover, for this
subgroup the effects on net rental income are more precisely estimated and positive for
letters (3) and (4).
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Table 6: Effects of letters and geographical intensity of the treatment – subgroup with reported
rental income in tax year 2014.
Dep. Var.
Reported
rental
income
(0/1)
Rental
income
(gross)
Rental
income
(net)
Spouse reported
rental
income
(0/1)
HH rental
income
(gross)
HH rental
income
(net)
Letter 1 0.00506 244.5 282.5** -0.00215 294.3 273.7**
[0.00395] [210.8] [113.6] [0.00503] [232.1] [135.6]
Letter 2 0.00777* 10.84 67.45 -0.00529 -272 -42.85
[0.00412] [107.8] [89.80] [0.00417] [285.6] [137.9]
Letter 3 0.0100*** 201.3** 180.9** 0.00819** 258.4** 178.2*
[0.00287] [85.86] [80.61] [0.00409] [110.8] [98.54]
Letter 4 0.0121*** 117.6 166.2*** -0.00027 186.9 191.2***
[0.00245] [114.0] [56.16] [0.00229] [139.4] [70.06]
Low intensity 0.00255 70.88 95.40* 0.000306 38.02 128.7*
blocks [0.00282] [80.10] [57.76] [0.00267] [96.05] [70.06]
High intensity 0.00448 -27.58 20.63 0.00194 -21.53 69.68
blocks [0.00274] [85.58] [60.04] [0.00256] [103.1] [74.84]
N 127695 127695 127695 82820 127695 127695
R-sq 0.045 0.031 0.015 0.005 0.022 0.013
Baseline mean 0.976 11026.5 6002.4 0.522 13695.1 7464.9
Notes: Table shows estimates for the effect of treatment letters and geographic intensity of the treat-
ment on reporting of rental income. Sample includes individuals who did not report rental income in
2014. The excluded category for letters (1)-(4) is no letter and the excluded category for low and high
intensity blocks is the control block where no treatment letters were sent. Data covers tax years 2014
(before treatment) and 2015 (after treatment). All models include individual fixed effects, the number
of apartments owned and additional enforcement measures related to the treatment letters as controls.
Standard errors clustered at postcode area level (263 clusters) are in brackets. Significance is denoted
by asterisks: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Bold font indicates significant difference at 5% level
relative to letter (1).
All in all, the results concerning reporting behavior of those receiving the letters right
after the treatment indicate that especially the treatment letter containing both infor-
mation on intensified enforcement and the use of third-party information had a positive
effect on the propensity to report, and on the reported amount of rental income. The
effects are very strong for the subgroup of potential landlords who did not report any
rental income in the year prior to the experiment.
In addition to these direct effects, the results in Tables 4-6 allow us to analyze whether
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information about intensified enforcement has spillover effects beyond those individuals
who receive a treatment letter. Spillover effects in tax reporting may arise if the infor-
mation on the treatments spreads within the household or between landlords. For this
purpose, the base population in our study is constructed in such a way that we are able
to examine potential spillovers within the household. Also, the randomized block design
similar to Cre´pon et al. (2013), enables us to analyze spillover effects from intensified
enforcement across landlords within local rental markets.
We first focus on spillovers between household members, where information sharing
may be particularly likely. The direction of possible spillover effects between spouses is not
obvious a priori. A threat effect induced by the treatment letters would suggest positive
spillovers. On the other hand, if spouses jointly own a flat and previously only one of
them has mistakenly reported income on the entire flat, letter (2) containing information
on how to report rental income may alert them to the fact that both of them should
report their rental income according to their ownership share. In this case the spillover
may also be negative.
Columns 4 of Tables 4-6 indicate in most cases negligible and statistically insignificant
spillovers, albeit the estimated coefficients are positive between spouses at the extensive
margin, i.e. in the likelihood of reporting any rental income. In the case of Table 4 and
letter (2), however, the spillover effect is negative, suggesting that the mechanism outlined
above may be operational in the case of the information treatment. Consistent with this
mechanism, the effect on the reported net rental income at the household level is very
small. The net effect of letter (2) on the propensity to report at the household level (the
sum of the coefficients in columns 1 and 4) remains positive however. Columns 5 and 6
take into account spillovers between spouses by focusing on the amount of reported rental
income at the household level. For letter (4) that notified the recipients of intensified en-
forcement and third-party information, the effects are somewhat stronger than in columns
2 and 3 looking at the individuals in the base population only. However, this difference
is not statistically significant.
The results in Table 5 point towards the existence of some positive reporting spillovers
between spouses in this subgroup of more likely evaders. In particular, we find positive
spillovers between spouses (column 4) in the case of the strongest treatment letter 4
notifying potential landlords of the use of third-party information in tax enforcement.
Next, we utilize the block design in order to analyze enforcement spillovers between
landlords in local rental markets. Local spillover effects are incorporated in the coefficients
γk in equation (1). In this specification, we find no evidence of local reporting spillovers.
Nevertheless, utilizing a block design that allows us to examine and control for potential
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regional spillovers, has the important benefit that we can be confident that the estimates
of the direct effects are not biased by potential spillovers.
To the extent that spillovers on non-treated landlords may be larger than spillovers
between letter recipients, the estimates of the block dummies in 4 and 5 may hide some
positive spillovers on non-treated landlords. Another, more direct way to test for the ex-
istence of reporting spillovers is to isolate effects on those who did not receive a treatment
letter. The results of this type of a specification are shown in Table A3 and Table A4 in
Appendix A, concentrating on spillovers within the high-intensity block. The results are
similar to those shown in Tables 4 and 5, namely that the estimated spillover effects are
positive but not statistically significant.
Finally, we move from the immediate effects of the experiment that reflect reporting
responses only to the analysis of behavior in subsequent years. Any effects found in later
years may incorporate both reporting and real responses to more intense tax enforcement,
as landlords will have had the opportunity to adjust their real estate holdings. For ex-
ample, scaling down on real estate holdings may be an optimal response to a perceived
increase in the effective tax rate on rental income caused by a perceived increase in the
intensity of tax enforcement.
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Table 7: Effects of treatment letters and geographical intensity of the treatment – tax year
2016.
Dep. Var.
Reported
rental
income
(0/1)
Rental
income
(gross)
Rental
income
(net)
Spouse reported
rental
income
(0/1)
HH rental
income
(gross)
HH rental
income
(net)
Letter 1 0.00297 4.578 54.44 0.000201 176 178.8
[0.00587] [151.0] [98.06] [0.00579] [199.2] [144.3]
Letter 2 0.00529 -100.1 -78.15 -0.00571 -520.6 -121.8
[0.00515] [108.2] [84.03] [0.00480] [415.8] [96.09]
Letter 3 -0.00529 77.39 -56.75 -0.0063 -55.07 -146.5
[0.00405] [206.5] [73.71] [0.00445] [234.3] [92.96]
Letter 4 0.00706* -40.19 55.03 -0.00124 27.61 92.39
[0.00416] [88.13] [49.84] [0.00349] [148.0] [82.62]
Low intensity -0.001 34.2 30.32 0.00173 -20.82 75.57
blocks [0.00387] [85.17] [62.43] [0.00296] [98.96] [70.44]
High intensity 0.00171 28.37 66.05 0.000937 22.69 103.6
blocks [0.00393] [91.04] [65.98] [0.00323] [120.1] [76.52]
N 172932 172932 172932 106215 172932 172932
R-sq 0.084 0.068 0.049 0.029 0.048 0.04
Baseline mean 0.769 8800.8 4713.7 0.442 11069.4 5909.6
Notes: Table shows estimates for the effect of treatment letters and geographic intensity of the treatment
on reporting of rental income. The excluded category for letters 1-4 is no letter and the excluded
category for low and high intensity blocks is control blocks where no treatment letters were sent. Data
covers tax years 2014 (before treatment) and 2016 (two years after treatment). All models include
individual fixed effects, the number of apartments owned and additional enforcement measures related
to the treatment letters as controls. Standard errors clustered at postcode area level (263 clusters) are in
brackets. Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Bold font indicates
significant difference at 5% level relative to letter (1).
The results for tax year 2016 (reporting in spring 2017) are shown in Table 7. We
find smaller effects on the propensity to report rental income than in Table 4 where we
focused on the immediate effects. We also no longer find any effects on the reported net
rental income (the intensive margin effect). These findings may be due to the impact
of the letters on reporting being diluted over time (a reporting effect): some potential
landlords may have forgotten about the treatment, or may perceive the threat of intensified
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enforcement no longer credible. Another potential explanation for the effects being smaller
in tax year 2016 is that some landlords may in fact have reduced their apartment holdings
due to a perceived higher effective tax rate on rental income (a real effect). At this stage
we are unable to disentangle these two effects.
5 Conclusion
We have reported the results from a large-scale randomized field experiment focusing on
rental income tax compliance. The experiment was conducted in spring 2016 and our data
covers two years of reporting behavior (spring 2016 and 2017) combined with a rich set of
other tax related information about potential landlords. This enables us to analyze the
effects of the treatment on the immediate reporting behavior of potential landlords, as well
as the behavior one year after the treatment. To distinguish between potential reasons
for non-compliance, we examine both the effects of providing simplifying information on
tax filing practices as well as notifying landlords of intensified tax enforcement.
Our findings suggest that different types of treatment letters had an effect on the
reporting behavior of potential landlords. The effect is most pronounced at the extensive
margin (that is, the propensity to report any rental income) while we also find some effects
on the intensive margin (that is, the euro amount of rental income reported). We find
that some potential landlords respond to the letter providing simplifying information on
tax-filing practices, suggesting that outright mistakes may play a role in non-compliance.
However, the strongest effects are found for the treatment letter that notified potential
landlords of the use of third-party information on the ownership of apartments in tax
enforcement.
We find largest effects for individuals who had reported no rental income in the year
prior to treatment: the strongest treatment, providing information on the use of third-
party information in tax enforcement, increased the propensity to report rental income in
this group by over 50%.
Our experimental design also allows for studying two types of reporting spillovers from
enforcement information. We have utilized a randomized block design where the intensity
of treatment varies between postcode areas, which allows us to analyze local reporting
spillovers. We do not find clear evidence of spillovers in reporting behavior between
landlords within local rental markets.
We also analyze reporting spillovers within the household, where we find some evidence
of positive spillovers. The (positive) effects of enforcement on tax reporting may be
understated if spillover effects are ignored.
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The letter that notified potential landlords of the use of third-party information in
the enforcement of the rental income tax increased reported net rental income at the
household level by about e220, which translates to an approximately e70 revenue gain
per household receiving this type of treatment letter. Our results indicate that making
the existence and utilization of third-party information more salient to potential landlords
is likely to be a highly cost-effective strategy for enforcement of the rental income tax.
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Appendix
A Additional tables
Table A1: Summary statistics for key variables 2014-2016.
Obs Mean Std.Dev. Median
1st
percentile
99th
percentile
Reported rental income (0/1) 259881 0.774 0.418 1 0 1
Gross rental income 259881 8794 22719 5868 0 63840
Net rental income 259881 4811 13217 2942 -1893 37273.17
Spouse reported rental income (0/1) 159669 0.442 0.497 0 0 1
HH Gross rental income 259881 11142 29849 6984 0 80566
HH Net rental income 259881 6091 17697 3689 -2367 47137
Owned apartments 259881 2.306 2.409 2 0 11
Potential rental apartments 259881 1.271 0.827 1 1 5
Notes: Table shows summary statistics for individuals in our control and treatment blocks and their
spouses for tax years 2014-2016.
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Table A2: Effects by treatment letter in areas outside the blocks (tax year 2015).
Dep. Var.
Reported
rental
income
(0/1)
Rental
income
(gross)
Rental
income
(net)
Spouse reported
rental
income
(0/1)
HH rental
income
(gross)
HH rental
income
(net)
Letter 1 0.0255*** 188.9** 22.55 0.00458 216.2** -11.65
[0.00536] [83.47] [63.39] [0.00517] [99.46] [75.70]
Letter 2 0.0444*** 109.8 31.49 0.0125*** 99.15 31.28
[0.00545] [73.01] [58.03] [0.00479] [83.59] [68.68]
Letter 3 0.0245** 171.7 -37.47 0.0251*** 369.7** -52.31
[0.0104] [136.4] [89.73] [0.00929] [180.5] [115.1]
Letter 4 0.0302*** -38.65 -93.47 0.00541 -41.03 -149.4
[0.00724] [105.6] [76.70] [0.00628] [126.5] [91.20]
N 83825 83825 83825 49957 83825 83825
R-sq 0.073 0.058 0.018 0.021 0.05 0.017
Baseline mean 0.717 6525.2 3314.1 0.398 8172.7 4151.8
Notes: Table shows estimates for the effect of treatment letters. Sample includes individuals in postcodes
outside the block design. The excluded category for letters (1)-(4) is no letter. All models include
individual fixed effects, the number of apartments owned and additional enforcement measures related to
the treatment letters as controls. Standard errors clustered at postcode area level (4,200 clusters) are in
brackets. Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Bold font indicates
significant difference at 5% level relative to letter (1).
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Table A3: Effects by treatment letter and spillovers in the high-intensity blocks (tax year
2015).
Dep. Var.
Reported
rental
income
(0/1)
Rental
income
(gross)
Rental
income
(net)
Spouse reported
rental
income
(0/1)
HH rental
income
(gross)
HH rental
income
(net)
No Letter -0.00136 19.28 30 0.000393 8.301 77.11
(high blocks) [0.00393] [85.18] [54.14] [0.00314] [99.75] [72.65]
Letter 1 0.00854 -92.03 110.5 0.00461 -35.29 149.7
(high blocks) [0.00806] [153.2] [110.7] [0.00659] [185.9] [131.2]
Letter 2 0.0188** -23.7 157.1 -0.0109** -58.65 192.4
(high blocks) [0.00830] [139.7] [96.84] [0.00516] [166.3] [118.0]
Letter 3 0.0173*** 130.8 172.6** 0.00557 148.7 181.9**
(high blocks) [0.00482] [95.47] [71.53] [0.00419] [116.0] [85.77]
Letter 4 0.0308*** 172.8 217.4*** 0.00568* 311.0* 323.8***
(high blocks) [0.00451] [136.6] [66.89] [0.00323] [177.9] [95.94]
N 116669 116669 116669 71446 116669 116669
R-sq 0.077 0.035 0.025 0.019 0.032 0.024
Baseline mean 0.747 8044.9 4366.6 0.427 10107.7 5491.7
Notes: Table shows estimates for the effect of treatment letters and spillover effects in high-intensity
blocks. Sample includes individuals in control and high-intensity blocks. The excluded category is no
letter in control blocks. All models include individual fixed effects, the number of apartments owned and
additional enforcement measures related to the treatment letters as controls. Standard errors clustered
at the postcode level (263 clusters) are in brackets. Significance is denoted by asterisks: * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Bold font indicates significant difference at 5% level relative to letter (1).
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Table A4: Effects by treatment letter and spillovers in the high-intensity block (tax year 2015)
- subgroup with no reported rental income in 2014.
Dep. Var.
Reported
rental
income
(0/1)
Rental
income
(gross)
Rental
income
(net)
Spouse reported
rental
income
(0/1)
HH rental
income
(gross)
HH rental
income
(net)
No Letter 0.0139 168.8 147.2 0.000577 158.2 153
(high blocks) [0.0137] [184.5] [107.8] [0.0106] [243.1] [157.3]
Letter 1 0.0357 -123 -78.18 0.0404* -249.4 -216.3
(high blocks) [0.0228] [242.4] [144.8] [0.0210] [508.8] [352.5]
Letter 2 0.0662*** 181.5 143.6 -0.019 0.042 49.89
(high blocks) [0.0243] [226.4] [160.4] [0.0216] [310.7] [223.6]
Letter 3 0.0523*** -17.92 61.34 0.00634 -93.07 19.93
(high blocks) [0.0155] [188.1] [121.1] [0.0142] [236.6] [159.2]
Letter 4 0.0978*** 542.3 316.8* 0.0280*** 741.9 459.7*
(high blocks) [0.0144] [388.1] [190.7] [0.00973] [454.2] [244.5]
N 30736 30736 30736 15862 30736 30736
R-sq 0.371 0.08 0.108 0.11 0.115 0.126
Baseline mean 0.152 1066.3 531.6 0.118 1583.6 793.5
Notes: Table shows estimates for the effect of treatment letters and spillover effects in high intensity
blocks. Sample includes individuals in control and high-intensity blocks who did not report rental income
in tax year 2014. The excluded category is no letter in control blocks. All models include individual fixed
effects, the number of apartments owned and additional enforcement measures related to the treatment
letters as controls. Standard errors clustered at the postcode level (263 clusters) are in brackets. Sig-
nificance is denoted by asterisks: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Bold font indicates significant
difference at 5% level relative to letter (1).
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Table A5: Effects by treatment letter and spillovers in the high-intensity block (tax year 2016).
Dep. Var.
Reported
rental
income
(0/1)
Rental
income
(gross)
Rental
income
(net)
Spouse reported
rental
income
(0/1)
HH rental
income
(gross)
HH rental
income
(net)
No Letter 0.00219 87.65 41.75 0.0014 27.46 73.24
(high blocks) [0.00417] [87.61] [65.86] [0.00351] [114.5] [78.50]
Letter 1 0.00142 -52.51 132.8 0.00241 214 382.4
(high blocks) [0.00787] [190.6] [155.3] [0.00686] [308.6] [231.8]
Letter 2 0.00212 -123.8 30.39 -0.00782 -279.2 -25.9
(high blocks) [0.00719] [146.3] [117.2] [0.00534] [216.2] [130.2]
Letter 3 -0.00317 -9.723 27.97 -0.00752* -188.6 -29.94
(high blocks) [0.00516] [107.6] [87.41] [0.00436] [140.5] [107.5]
Letter 4 0.00930* -18.22 139.6* 0.000862 56.21 223.5**
(high blocks) [0.00478] [112.8] [72.92] [0.00366] [170.2] [103.6]
N 116660 116660 116660 71439 116660 116660
R-sq 0.083 0.069 0.053 0.027 0.055 0.043
Baseline mean 0.746 8235.7 4455.2 0.43 10364.7 5604.6
Notes: Table shows estimates for the effect of treatment letters and spillover effects in high intensity
blocks. Sample includes individuals in control and high-intensity blocks in tax years 2014 and 2016. The
excluded category is no letter in control blocks. All models include individual fixed effects, the number
of apartments owned and additional enforcement measures related to the treatment letters as controls.
Standard errors clustered at the postcode level (263 clusters) are in brackets. Significance is denoted by
asterisks: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Bold font indicates significant difference at 5% level
relative to letter (1).
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VATT_1 1.2016 vero.fi
Letter 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ref. 
Check your pre-completed tax return 
You have received a pre-completed tax return containing information on your 
earnings and deductions in 2015. Review the tax return with care. If the information 
is correct and nothing is missing, you need not do anything. If the information is 
incorrect, or some pieces of information are missing, you must correct or 
supplement the tax return. Information to be supplemented may include rental 
income, travel expenses between your home and place of work, or tax credit for 
household expenses, for example. 
You can supplement and correct the information in the pre-completed tax return in 
the Tax return online service (vero.fi/veroilmoitus). The service will remain open 
until the tax return deadline indicated on your tax return. If you supplement your tax 
return online, you need not use the tax return form or its appendix forms. 
If you use a paper form to submit your tax return by regular post, you must also 
send the required appendix forms. For example, you must use form 7H to 
announce your rental income from a unit in a housing company and form 14A to 
get your tax credit for household expenses. The required appendix forms are listed 
in the instructions on how to complete the tax return. Don’t forget to enter the 
required pieces of information in the correct part of the tax return form in addition to 
the appendix forms. 
For more information, please visit vero.fi/henkilöasiakkaat > Veroilmoitus 
(Individual taxpayers > Tax return) or call the service number specified in your pre-
completed tax return. 
Finnish Tax Administration 
VERO SKATT 
NOTICE 
Finnish Tax Administration PO Box 325 FI-
00052 Vero, Finland 
VATT_2 1.2016 vero.fi
Letter 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ref. 
Check your pre-completed tax return 
You have received a pre-completed tax return containing information on your earnings and 
deductions in 2015. Review the tax return with care. If the information is correct and nothing 
is missing, you need not do anything. If the information is incorrect, or some pieces of 
information are missing, you must correct or supplement the tax return. Information to be 
supplemented may include rental income, travel expenses between your home and place of 
work, or tax credit for household expenses, for example. 
If you received rental income in 2015, announce the rental income and related expenses. 
The most common expenses to be deducted from rental income include maintenance 
charges, annual repair costs and real estate tax. If you received rental income from several 
sources (such as a unit in a housing company and a summer home), you must separately 
announce the income and expenses of each property. If you own a unit in a housing 
company with another person, you must only announce the share of rental income and 
expenses corresponding to your share of ownership. Calculate the amount of taxable rental 
income by deducting the expenses from the rental income. 
Example of calculating rental income 
The taxpayer owns one unit in a housing company, which they rented out for the entire year 
of 2015, with the rent being EUR 1,000 per month. The taxpayer/landlord paid a 
maintenance charge of EUR 250 per month. Other expenses related to the renting of the 
apartment totalled EUR 1,500. The taxable rental income is the difference between the 
rental income and expenses, or 12 x EUR 1,000 - 12 x EUR 250 - EUR 1,500 = EUR 7,500. 
Hence, the taxable rental income is EUR 7,500. 
You can supplement and correct the information in the pre-completed tax return in the Tax 
return online service (vero.fi/veroilmoitus). The service will remain open until the tax return 
deadline indicated on your tax return. If you supplement your tax return online, you need not 
use the tax return form or its appendix forms. 
If you use a paper form to submit your tax return by regular post, you must also send the 
required appendix forms. For example, you must use form 7H to announce your rental 
income from a unit in a housing company and form 14A to get your tax credit for household 
expenses. The required appendix forms are listed in the instructions on how to complete the 
tax return. Don’t forget to enter the required pieces of information in the correct part of the 
tax return form in addition to the appendix forms. 
For more information, please visit vero.fi/henkilöasiakkaat > Veroilmoitus (Individual 
taxpayers > Tax return) or call the service number specified in your pre-completed tax 
return. 
Finnish Tax Administration 
VERO SKATT 
NOTICE 
Finnish Tax Administration PO Box 325 FI-
00052 Vero, Finland 
VATT_3 1.2016 vero.fi
Letter 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ref. 
Check your pre-completed tax return 
You have received a pre-completed tax return containing information on your 
earnings and deductions in 2015. Review the tax return with care. If the information 
is correct and nothing is missing, you need not do anything. If the information is 
incorrect, or some pieces of information are missing, you must correct or 
supplement the tax return. Information to be supplemented may include rental 
income, travel expenses between your home and place of work, or tax credit for 
household expenses, for example. 
The Finnish Tax Administration is boosting the monitoring of tax to be paid 
for rental income. Hence, additional information on rental income and related 
expenses will be requested more often than before. The additional information 
is needed for the Tax Administration to verify that the rental income and expenses 
specified in your tax return are correct. 
If you received rental income in 2015, you must announce all rental income you 
received and related expenses. If necessary, the Tax Administration can request 
receipts or other additional information on your rental income and expenses. If we 
need additional information on your rental income, you will receive a request to 
supplement your tax return after the tax return deadline. Do not enclose your 
receipts with your tax return, however; the Tax Administration will separately 
request them if necessary. 
You can supplement and correct the information in the pre-completed tax return in 
the Tax return online service (vero.fi/veroilmoitus). The service will remain open 
until the tax return deadline indicated on your tax return. If you supplement your tax 
return online, you need not use the tax return form or its appendix forms. 
If you use a paper form to submit your tax return by regular post, you must also 
send the required appendix forms. For example, you must use form 7H to 
announce your rental income from a unit in a housing company and form 14A to 
get your tax credit for household expenses. The required appendix forms are listed 
in the instructions on how to complete the tax return. Don’t forget to enter the 
required pieces of information in the correct part of the tax return form in addition to 
the appendix forms. 
For more information, please visit vero.fi/henkilöasiakkaat > Veroilmoitus 
(Individual taxpayers > Tax return) or call the service number specified in your pre-
completed tax return. 
Finnish Tax Administration 
VERO SKATT NOTICE 
Finnish Tax Administration  
PO Box 325  
FI-00052 Vero, Finland 
VATT_4 1.2016 vero.fi
Letter 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ref. 
Check your pre-completed tax return 
You have received a pre-completed tax return containing information on your earnings and 
deductions in 2015. Review the tax return with care. If the information is correct and nothing 
is missing, you need not do anything. If the information is incorrect, or some pieces of 
information are missing, you must correct or supplement the tax return. Information to be 
supplemented may include rental income, travel expenses between your home and place of 
work, or tax credit for household expenses, for example. 
The Finnish Tax Administration is boosting the monitoring of tax to be paid for rental 
income. Hence, additional information on rental income and related expenses will be 
requested more often than before. 
The additional information is needed for the Tax Administration to verify that the rental 
income and expenses specified in your tax return are correct. 
The rental income information for 2015 will be compared to information on landlords’ 
property ownership more comprehensively than before. Special attention will be paid to 
tax returns where the rental income information is not consistent with the property ownership 
information. According to the information available to the Tax Administration, you own at 
least one unit in a housing company, and the apartment may have been rented out in 2015. 
If you received rental income in 2015, you must announce all rental income you received 
and related expenses. If necessary, the Tax Administration can request receipts or other 
additional information on your rental income and expenses. If we need additional information 
on your rental income, you will receive a request to supplement your tax return after the tax 
return deadline. Do not enclose your receipts with your tax return, however; the Tax 
Administration will separately request them if necessary. 
You can supplement and correct the information in the pre-completed tax return in the Tax 
return online service (vero.fi/veroilmoitus). The service will remain open until the tax return 
deadline indicated on your tax return. If you supplement your tax return online, you need not 
use the tax return form or its appendix forms. 
If you use a paper form to submit your tax return by regular post, you must also send the 
required appendix forms. For example, you must use form 7H to announce your rental 
income from a unit in a housing company and form 14A to get your tax credit for household 
expenses. The required appendix forms are listed in the instructions on how to complete the 
tax return. Don’t forget to enter the required pieces of information in the correct part of the 
tax return form in addition to the appendix forms. 
For more information, please visit vero.fi/henkilöasiakkaat > Veroilmoitus (Individual 
taxpayers > Tax return) or call the service number specified in your pre-completed tax 
return. 
Finnish Tax Administration 
VERO SKATT NOTICE 
Finnish Tax Administration  
PO Box 325  
FI-00052 Vero, Finland 
